We have been watching for the last 16 months in real-time the unfolding events in Gaza. The focus has rightly been on Israel, Palestine and the Middle East and how the evolving war was affecting the region. However, the tragedy of the war, has had long lasting impact, not only on the key protagonists, but also on third countries and institutions. This article focuses on the impact of the Gaza war on the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Never before, have EU member states been so divided over a foreign policy issue, as over Gaza and how to react to it. Disagreements between member states have always existed, particularly since foreign policy is still a national competence[1]. However, the EU CFSP has been evolving over the last decade, towards more joint positions and common actions since it aims to enable the 27 member countries, to carry more weight on the world stage, than if they were to act alone and positions are much more impactful than the sum of the positions of the member states. Most of the time, when there were disagreements between member states, these have been between a large majority and a small number of states forming the minority. An example of this, has been the EU reaction to the war in Ukraine. Consistently, most of the member states had a clearly pro-Ukraine, pro-sanctions stance, while often Hungary and the Czech Republic have been taking a more pro-Russia stance by blocking unanimity. Nonetheless, some agreements were reached.
The bilateral relations between the EU and Palestine and between the EU and Israel are widely different. The total trade between the EU and Palestine in 2022 was €444 million of which €419 million were exports from the EU primarily of transport equipment[2]. The EU is also a major provider of humanitarian aid for Palestine, with most of the aid being channeled through UN Palestine Refugee Agency (UNWRA).[3] The EU’s multi-annual financial allocation for Palestine under the European Joint Strategy 2021-2024 amounts to €1.177 billion.
By contrast, the EU-Israeli relations are governed by the EU-Israel Association Agreement[4] that entered force in 2000. The EU-Israel Association Agreement provides a legal and institutional framework for political dialogue and economic cooperation between the EU and Israel. The EU is Israel’s biggest trade partner and totaltrade in goods between the EU and Israel in 2022 amounted to €46.8 billion. About one third of Israel’s imports came from the EU, and 25.6% of the country’s exports went to the EU. In this agreement, as in other EU bilateral agreements, there is an ‘essential elements clause’, which allows parties to partially or fully, suspend an agreement unilaterally in case it is breached. In May 2024, the 27 member states unanimously agreed to convene an Association Council to hold Tel Aviv to account for the carnage in Gaza. However, Israel did not respond to the invitation, successfully betting that the new European Commission college which took office in December 2024, would be weaker on its focus on human rights violations, as well as on the re-election of President Trump. The EU-Israel Council has now taken place on the 24th of February 2025 and its weak results confirmed Israel’s strategy.
In order to highlight the rifts that exist between EU member states policies with respect to Gaza, let’s look at some major milestones of this war:
- UN resolutions and MS voting:
- The deep divisions between member states voting on practically all UN resolutions on Gaza since the war started, are very visible. For example, on the 12 of December 2023, a resolution of the General Assembly[5] calling for the immediate humanitarian ceasefire passed with an overwhelming majority of 153 in favor, 10 against and 23 abstentions. However, EU member states were voting in all three groups of countries. Namely: Austria, Czechia voted no; Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia abstained and all other 17 member states supported the resolution. Another example, is the most recent resolution of the General Assembly on the 11th of December 2024[6], demanding the immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza and Israel to allow the UN Palestine Refugee Agency (UNRWA) to carry out aid operations unrestricted was supported by 158 states, 9 against and 11 abstentions. From the EU, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Netherlands abstained[7].
- The deep divisions between member states voting on practically all UN resolutions on Gaza since the war started, are very visible. For example, on the 12 of December 2023, a resolution of the General Assembly[5] calling for the immediate humanitarian ceasefire passed with an overwhelming majority of 153 in favor, 10 against and 23 abstentions. However, EU member states were voting in all three groups of countries. Namely: Austria, Czechia voted no; Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia abstained and all other 17 member states supported the resolution. Another example, is the most recent resolution of the General Assembly on the 11th of December 2024[6], demanding the immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza and Israel to allow the UN Palestine Refugee Agency (UNRWA) to carry out aid operations unrestricted was supported by 158 states, 9 against and 11 abstentions. From the EU, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Netherlands abstained[7].
- Disagreements within the EU :
- Between the college members: Very soon after October 7th 2023, a very public disagreement between the then EU Commissioners took place on how to respond to the war, which mainly played out on their respective X – accounts:
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, ex German Minister of Defense, declared full support for Israel. Von der Leyen was later challenged by the Council because she is not mandated to talk on EU foreign policy as this is the mandate of the High Representative and Vice President of the EU (HRVP) Josep Borrell. Spanish HRVP Borrell, openly disagreed with Commission President’s announcements on Gaza and underlined that the EU policy was different from what she had declared.
But the disagreements did not stop there. The then Hungarian Commissioner Olivier Varhelyi – Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement – announced that aid to UNRWA was stopping, only to be contradicted by the then Slovenian Commissioner Janez Lenarcic – Commissioner for Crisis Management (EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid) saying EU would not only continue to finance UNRWA, but increase its contribution.
- Disagreements between the staff of the EU and their political bosses:
The disagreement on the policy to the crisis in Gaza was even evident within the EU staff ranks. EU staff sent an open letter to EC President van der Leyen, requesting a change in policy and for the EU to become less “pro-Israel”. A number of EU staff have also risked their careers by demonstrating outside EU buildings – which was an unprecedented move.
- The disagreements were also public between the HRVP and the member states, when HRVP following a Council meeting with member state representatives declared in a press conference:
“If you believe that too many people are being killed – maybe you should provide less arms.”[8]. “They are going to evacuate (i.e. from Rafah)– where to? To the moon?”
- EU Governments and their citizens: In most of the member states, massive demonstrations have repeatedly taken place over the last 16 months, with the majority of EU citizens demanding that their respective government’s support the ceasefire. Twelve member states have now banned pro-Palestine demonstrations[9]. However, as for example in Germany in February 2025 demonstrations did continue despite the heavy-handed handling of the demonstrators by the police. In February 2025, also Germany took the unprecedented step to cancel two speeches at universities by Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur for Palestine.
- International Court of Justice (ICJ) application filed by South Africa on 29 Dec 2023 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip
At the hearings of the ICJ to examine the application filed by South Africa, which took place in January 2024, a total of 52 countries and entities spoke of which 8 were EU member states. Belgium, Ireland, Slovenia, Spain spoke in support of South Africa’s application of a genocide case against Israel, while Netherlands, France, Hungary, Luxembourg spoke in support of Israel. The EU did not have a common position and did not take the floor, unlike other organizations such as the African Union and the Organisation of Islamic States. In addition to the four member states that supported South Africa’s position in January 2024, in January 2025, Ireland formally joined them.
- On the issue of arms exports to Israel, Germany in 2023, increased tenfold its arms exports to Israel by comparison to its 2022 figures. Most recent figures for Germany are not readily available. At the same time following court cases launched by Oxfam and other NGOs, the Netherlands was ordered to stop the exports of F-35 fighter jet parts to Israel. A similar court case was filed in Denmark in 2024 by Oxfam and other NGOs in order to stop arms exports to Israel and there have been demonstrations against illegal arms exports from the Danish company Terma.
- Recognition of the State of Palestine
As of June 2024, the State of Palestine is recognized as a foreign state by 146 of the 193 member states of the UN, i.e. over 75% of the UN member states. From the EU member states, 11 out of the 27, have already recognized the State of Palestine[10]. These are: Romania, Cyprus, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1988; Sweden in 2014 and in 2024: Ireland, Slovenia and Spain. Ireland and Spain have been quite vocal supporters of the Palestinian cause. Following the announcement by Israel of the shutting down of its embassy in Dublin in 2024, the premises will potentially become a Palestinian Museum.
- The EU tried nonetheless to take a unified stance on events in Gaza despite the difficulties of the blocking stance of Hungary.In the February 2024 Council, after being unable to issue a joint statement, it issued the following statement:
“All European Union countries except for Hungary, have jointly called for an eventual ceasefire in Gaza and urged Israel not to launch its planned assault in Rafah.”
HRVP Borrell was then stating:” I am supposed to represent a common position, but there is not a common position, there are different approaches. But there are more Member States today supporting the ceasefire than in the previous votes, this is a fact. More and more people are leaning to the side of asking for a ceasefire, but the leaders will have to discuss.”
- EU national bans on extremists Israeli settlers:
From early in in the conflict, HRVP Borrell in January 2023 pushed for several the of extremist Israeli settlers to be put on a blacklist – for visits to the EU and their assets to be frozen – because of serious and systematic human rights abuses against Palestinians in the West Bank. Belgium who then had the EU Presidency, as well as France and the Netherlands, supported the idea, but other member states had different shades of objections to the initiative. It was not until March 2024 that the European Union – after a political agreement emerged among the block’s 27 member countries – that it finally moved to sanction a handful of Israeli settlers responsible for major attacks on Palestinian communities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, following over a year of deliberations.[11]
EU’s global commitments and long-standing objectives
The EU has always been promoting multilateralism and the global rules-based order and the promotion of the EU principles. With the International Criminal Court (ICC) for example, “the EU is resolved to continue protecting the independence of the Court”[12].
However, when the UN-backed ICC in November 2024, issued arrest warrants against PM Netanyahu and former defense minister Gallant and a former Hamas commander, again the EU, could not react coherently. When in February 2025, US President Trump imposed sanctions on the ICC and its top prosecutor, EC President Ursula von der Leyen in an X-post made vague promises to support the ICC, without even naming who the post was referring to and why. This was in a stark contrast of what she rightfully, in my view, posted just two years prior, when the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Russian President Putin (see photo). EU reactions with respect to the ICC are even more problematic since those arrest warrants were issued. Keeping in mind that the signatory states of the ICC are obliged to enforce its decisions and all member states of the EU are in fact signatories, we saw nonetheless that PM Netanyahu has visited both Hungary and Poland since those arrest warrants were issued and his plane has had overfly rights over France when he visited the US in February 2025. By contrast, other Member States have declared that they will enforce the ruling of the ICC and would arrest Netanyahu if he were to visit.
Most recently, immediately after the sanctions posed by the US on the ICC, a joint statement[13] in support of the ICC was issued signed by 79 countries, including EU MS but it was not signed by Hungary and the Czech Republic.
The reputation of the EU has painfully been built over decades, as being based on principles and values. As this article highlights, the EU’s inability to adopt common positions vis-à-vis the events in Gaza and the deep split between the member states, have damaged the EU’s credibility and raises several questions. How can such wide positions exist between the member states, if you they are based on agreed principles and values? What is guiding these wide positions on events, if not principles? Given that most of the European citizens were pro-Palestinian, what was guiding their governments to ignore their call? Is it historical ties, business interests, internal political party politics, other? Finally, these deeply visible divisions between the member states have weakened the EU’s capacity to act and has damaged its standing in the world, because it has moved further away from its stated objective to be “much more impactful than the sum of its member states positions”.
Is easy to conclude that the war in Gaza has not only drastically changed Israel and Palestine and the wider Middle East, but it has also critically exposed and damaged the EU’s foreign policy and its credibility in the world.
Androulla Kaminara
[1] [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/foreign_and_security_policy.html?root_default=SUM_1_CODED%3D25&locale=en
[2] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/palestine_en
[3] In 2020 funding to UNRWA was at 102 M euros
[4] https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/eu-israel-association-agreement
[5] https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144717
[6] https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12667.doc.htm
[7] https://x.com/un_news_centre/status/1866964177295667547?s=43&t=_ALZZoKc7s1X-oSQASI5MA
[9] Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, and Sweden.
[10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Palestine
[11] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/07/15/extremist-israeli-settlers-in-the-occupied-west-bank-and-east-jerusalem-as-well-as-violent-activists-blocking-humanitarian-aid-to-gaza-five-individuals-and-three-entities-sanctioned-under-the-eu-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime/
[12] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/international-criminal-justice_en
[13] https://x.com/luxembourgun/stat/1887866279437942973?s=46&mx=2
